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One of macroeconomists’ major concerns is GDP volatility, and understanding what causes this volatility is
essential when attempting to reduce it. For decades, the automotive industry has been a major component of
US GDP. Therefore, understanding the driving forces behind this industry indirectly contributes to the study
of GDP volatility. This paper focuses on CAFE standards and how they change the effect of oil prices on US
automobile sales.
What motivates this paper is the fact that during the mid-to-late 80s, fluctuations in the market share of
domestic automobile manufacturers diminished substantially. Figure 1 presents the sales of domestic
automakers’ automobiles as a fraction of the domestic market (market share) from January 1974 to June 2004.
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of Gasoline Prices on Domestic Automobile 
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INTRODUCTION
 One of macroeconomists’ major concerns is GDP volatility, and under-
standing what causes this volatility is essential when attempting to reduce it. 
For decades, the automotive industry has been a major component of US GDP. 
Therefore, understanding the driving forces behind this industry indirectly con-
tributes to the study of GDP volatility. This paper focuses on CAFE standards 
and how they change the effect of oil prices on US automobile sales. 
  What motivates this paper is the fact that during the mid-to-late 80s, 
fluctuations in the market share of domestic automobile manufacturers dimin-
ished substantially. Figure 1 presents the sales of domestic automakers’ auto-
mobiles as a fraction of the domestic market (market share) from January 1974 
to June 2004. One can easily notice that around month 170, which corresponds 
to February 1988, there is a dramatic decrease in volatility. What could be the 
cause in the decrease of this volatility?
 One of the major differences between American and foreign automobiles 
has been their fuel efficiencies. In their hedonic technique for estimating the 
demand for automobile fuel efficiency, Atkinson and Halvorsen conclude that 
an increase in the price of gasoline results in an increased demand for “foreign, 
more fuel efficient, automobiles”. This finding is not surprising because gasoline 
is a complement for automobiles. This paper focuses on Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE), a policy that increases fuel efficiency, to explain the reduction 
in the volatility of domestic automobile manufacturers’ national market share.
CAFE REGULATIONS
 CAFE standards were enacted in 1975 in response to the 1973-1974 
Arab oil embargoes. CAFE is the sales weighted average fuel economy, expressed 
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in miles per gallon, of a manufacturer’s fleet of passenger cars manufactured for 
sale in the United States. Fuel economy is defined as the average mileage traveled 
by an automobile per gallon of gasoline. The mileage standard increased to 27.5 
mpg in 1985, and it currently remains at that level. 
 Congress specified that CAFE standards must be set at the “maximum 
feasible level”. This means that factors such as technological feasibility and eco-
nomic practicability must be taken into consideration before setting a standard. 
Thus, the burden of CAFE standards should be reasonable.
 Manufacturers’ domestic and import fleets must separately meet the 
27.5 mpg CAFE standard so as not to be subjected to any penalties. Penalties 
include a civil fine of $55 per car/mpg. For example, if a manufacturer produces 
one million cars with a sales-weighted mpg of 26.5 mpg, that firm would be sub-
ject to a fine of $55 per car/mpg * 1 million cars * 1 mpg, or $55 million. Some 
foreign automakers view this fine as a tax, and manufacturers such as BMW and 
Mercedes-Benz have routinely paid CAFE fines (Kleit 1981). However, Ameri-
can firms view these standards as binding because their lawyers have advised 
them that if they violate the standards, they would be liable for civil damages 
in stockholders’ suits. Thus, domestic manufacturers have never paid a civil 
penalty. Asian manufacturers have never paid civil penalties either. The next 
section provides an important event in the domestic automobile industry.
A BRIEF HISTORY
 In 1981, the US was suffering the effects of the second OPEC oil price 
shock. Faced with higher gasoline prices, consumers began to shift their demand 
from low fuel efficiency US autos to higher fuel efficiency Japanese autos. In 
fact, Chrysler Corporation would have gone bankrupt if it weren’t for the US 
government’s subsidized loans. After several discussions with the US trade 
representatives, the Japanese eventually agreed to a Voluntary Export Restraint 
policy on auto exports, which lasted until the early 90s. The result of VERs was 
to increase the price for the importing countries because of a reduction in sup-
ply. Portney et al. (2003) found that tighter CAFE standards raised the price of 
new vehicles, so one would think VERs slightly offset the price effect of tighter 
CAFE standards by making Japanese automobiles slightly less attractive. How-
ever, many Japanese manufacturers shipped unassembled autos to Taiwan and 
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South Korea, where they were assembled and exported to the US. Furthermore, 
manufacturers such as Honda, Mazda, Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Nissan opened 
assembly plants in the US and were not included in the export restriction.  
  
LITERATURE REVIEW
 Extensive work on CAFE standards and their impact on general welfare has 
been done, and although many economists have found the standards to save some 
gasoline, the welfare losses associated with CAFE standards are too large. Kleit (2004) 
found that a long run 3.0 MPG increase in the CAFE standard would impose an 
estimated welfare loss of about $4 billion per year and save about 5.2 billion gallons 
of gasoline per year. He also suggests that an 11 cent-per-gallon tax would generate 
the same amount of fuel saving while only costing $290 million per year. Portney 
et al. (2003) also found that tighter standards would save gasoline, but they would 
also increase the price of new vehicles, worsen traffic congestion and--depending 
on how they are phased in--possibly even reduce occupant safety.
 To my knowledge, no economist has examined the effect of CAFE stan-
dards on the volatility of the automotive domestic market share. Kleit (2002), 
among others, goes so far as to find that the standards shift revenue away from 
U.S. automakers to foreign firms. However, it is reasonable to believe that CAFE 
standards make domestic vehicles on par with foreign vehicles in terms of fuel 
efficiency. Also, it should come at no surprise that fluctuations in oil prices have 
been found to have a significant effect on the sales of automobiles: Atkinson and 
Halvorsen (1984) conclude that an increase in the price of gasoline results in an 
increased demand for fuel efficiency. Although Duncan (1980) did not find the 
price of gasoline to have a significant effect on the aggregate demand, he found 
it affected the relative ratios of different vehicles significantly. One explanation 
behind this is that some people cannot be without cars because of impractical 
alternatives (non-hassle free public transportation), so they decide to purchase 
more fuel-efficient vehicles instead.
 MODEL
 In modeling the effects of CAFE standards, this paper uses the do-
mestic market share of domestic automakers (auto market share). This variable 
has many advantages over using gross sales. For example, when dealing with 
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market share, we can concentrate on factors that lead to an increase or decrease 
in foreign automobile sales in domestic markets without having to worry about 
consumers switching to other forms of transportation such as light trucks or 
public transportation. Therefore, analyzing changes in market distribution can 
help shed light on how CAFE standards have changed the competitiveness of 
domestic automobiles in comparison with foreign automobiles.
 The rest of the model is based on affordability; given certain assump-
tions, whether a consumer will purchase a domestic automobile or a foreign 
automobile will depend on several factors that contribute to affordability. Before 
purchasing a vehicle, a consumer will consider interest rates, which dictate his 
cost of borrowing to purchase the car. Given a consumer who needs to purchase 
a new car, the higher the interest rate, the more likely his/her choice will be af-
fected by the car’s price because of differences in interest payments. Although 
one argument against using this variable is that the lending rate is the same 
whether one buys foreign or domestic automobiles, it is included in the model 
because Portney et al (2003) found that tighter CAFE standards increase the 
price of new cars. If the standards raise the prices of domestic automobiles, then 
this variable is relevant. Another important factor is the exchange rate, which 
affects the prices of foreign automobiles, making them more or less competi-
tive. Thus, a high exchange rate (price of domestic currency in this case) should 
have a negative impact on the domestic share of the domestic market. A third 
factor that would matter is disposable income. As disposable income increases, 
one would expect consumers to purchase an automobile without as much price 
consideration. Thus, the model uses this idea to try and correct for any price 
effect that would otherwise not be visible. Finally, oil prices, which are deter-
mined in part by the state of the US economy, because the US consumes about 
25% of the world’s oil production, matter when buying a domestic or foreign 
automobile because of historical differences in fuel efficiencies. This variable is 
very important because as CAFE standards become tighter, we would expect 
fuel efficiencies to converge, making this variable less significant. Finally, given 
the US government’s pro free trade characteristics, tariffs are not assigned a role 
in this model.
 Some reasonable assumptions are made in this model. The first assump-
tion is that technology is homogenous. This means that domestic automakers can 
borrow foreign automakers’ technology and produce everything they produce. 
Of course, there are some adjustment costs for domestic manufacturers. The 
106
second assumption dictates that ceteris paribus, American consumers prefer 
domestic automobiles. This is a reasonable assumption if one considers senti-
ments of nationalism, or knowledge of how economy works, coupled with the 
desire to see it grow. Another argument for the latter assumption would be 
employee discounts and bonuses, which without loss of generality can also be 
considered a preference for domestic vehicles.
DATA
 All the data are monthly and range from January 1974 to June 2004. 
Unadjusted monthly data on motor vehicles unit sales were obtained from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The variable auto market share is created and 
represents domestic automobile sales as a fraction of domestic plus foreign 
automobile sales. The prime rate, in percent, was obtained from the Saint Louis 
Federal Reserve’s database as a measurement of the interest rate. The exchange 
rate is composed of a weighted average of the major currencies that were traded 
against the US dollar and was obtained from the same database as the prime rate. 
Disposable income is in real terms, and oil prices denote the price per barrel 
that refineries pay to acquire their oil. 
 There is extensive literature about testing and correcting for unit roots 
when working with time series data. To be safe, the Dickey-Fuller test was used 
to test whether the null, which assumes a unit root, could be rejected at the 
5% level. When it could be rejected, the variable was left unchanged. However, 
when there was not enough evidence to reject the unit root, the first difference 
of the variable was taken and the whole process repeated. Table 1 displays the 
results for the Dickey Fuller tests. 
Table 1
 undifferenced  differenced
  variable test statistic p-value test statistic p-value
  oil prices -1.095 0.7175 -12.528  0.0000
  exchange rate -1.167 0.6873 -13.675  0.0000
  prime rate -1.273 0.6405 -10.777  0.0000
  disposable income 3.724  1 -22.819  0.0000
  auto_market_share -3.917 0.0019 -3.917  0.0019
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 Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the final variables throughout 
the entire time period. The number of observations sheds light on whether the 
variable was differenced or not.
Table 2
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
  auto_market_share 366 0.7709162 0.0504563 0.6594085 0.8789939
  exchange_rate 365 -0.0502025 1.718167 -6.898399 5.458206
  prime_rate 365 -0.0156712 0.5629499 -3.94 4.290001
  disposable_income 365 0.0024172 0.0077151 -0.0393429 0.0573816
  oil 365 -0.0153425 2.056409 -12.01 11.27
METHODOLOGY
 “VAR [vector autoregression] methodology superficially resembles 
simultaneous-equation modeling in that we consider several endogenous 
variables together (Gujarati).” An advantage of VARs is that each endogenous 
variable is explained by the lags of all the other endogenous variables, and there 
are usually no exogenous variables. VAR models also make use of the Cholesky 
decomposition to provide impulse response functions. When graphed, these 
response functions show dynamic responses of certain variables to shocks in 
other variables. The model to be estimated is:
 ttt uWLAW ++= −10 )(a
where W is the vector composed of changes in oil prices (O), changes in the 
exchange rates (ε), changes in the prime rate (i), changes in disposable income 
(d), and the domestic auto market share (m). (L) is the lag operator that begins 
with the identity matrix. Thus, the Cholesky ordering is as follows:      
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where  
                                                          
;
and where  
 The VAR model assumes certain variables are only explained contempo-
raneously by some of the other variables. Oil is contemporaneously determined 
by everything else, whereas exchange rates are contemporaneously affected by 
all the variables except oil. Changes in the prime rate are contemporaneously 
affected by changes in disposable income and the auto market share, whereas 
changes in disposable income are only contemporaneously affected by auto 
market share. This model assumes all variables can be explained by the lags of 
all the other variables in the model.
 A difficult component in estimating VAR models is choosing the number 
of lags. There exists, as one might expect, a tradeoff between choosing too many 
or too few lags (degrees of freedom). One way to determine the number of lags 
to be used is the Akaike criterion. This consists of running the VAR estimation 
several times using a different number of lags and choosing the number of lags 
that yields the most negative value for the Akaike estimation. Another method 
involves calculating autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations to help one 
decide the lags to be included based on their significance. In this paper, I take 
both methods into consideration while choosing the lags that I believe to be 
important. This is done because econometricians claim that theory must come 
before numbers. The lags chosen are 1, 3, 6, and 12. Notice that this choice 
reflects what happened in the previous month, which shows the most recent 
conditions, what happened in the end of the previous quarter, which in certain 
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months is important for some firms, and what happened six months ago as well 
as last year, which were chosen because of common practice in time series. 
 Finally, the data is broken down into two groups: pre and post 1985, 
which is the year the CAFE standards reached their highest point. The Cholesky 
decomposition was used in obtaining the graphs of impulse response functions; 
the responses of US auto market share to shocks in the prices of oil are displayed 
in the results section.  
RESULTS
 As can be seen from figures 2 and 3, there is a stronger response in 
auto market share to shocks in oil prices from 1974 to 1984. Furthermore, this 
shock is negative and significant, which means that as the price of oil jumped 
up before 1985, auto market share decreased. From figure 3, one can notice 
that fuel efficiencies have converged as the CAFE standards reached their peak 
because oil shocks no longer have a significant effect on auto market share.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
 Many events have occurred in the automotive industry since 1974. 
However, the most notable of these changes was the implementation of CAFE 
standards. Thanks to these standards, changes in the price of oil have ceased to 
significantly affect domestic auto-manufacturers’ share of the domestic market. 
Other events, such as the Japanese voluntary export restraints, have also taken 
place during this time period, but there is no theoretical evidence supporting 
their relevance in the decreased volatility of automobile manufacturer’s domestic 
market share. Furthermore, when the VERs are given up, fluctuations in the 
market share do not pick up. 
 An interesting question, which is a hot debate at the moment, is whether 
CAFE standards must be increased or not. For now, the results of this paper show 
that the standards do not need to be raised because oil prices have little effect on 
market share volatility. However, one must consider the fact that technology is 
continuously improving, and as foreign vehicles become more efficient, CAFE 
standards may need to be raised in order to keep up with the competition.
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